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1. Introduction 
Multinationals have the capacity, and the long-term practice, to make use of dis-
parities of national tax laws, in order to minimize their overall tax burden. Strate-
gically making use of losses as a type of aggressive tax planning scenario is one of 
the most intriguing problems. OECD has recognized Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) in 2013 as an aggressive tax-planning phenomenon and launched 
action plans to combat typical BEPS scenarios and propose solutions. Being influ-
enced by the BEPS campaign, the European Union also takes anti-BEPS/anti-tax 
avoidance as one policy goal of its ambitious project: Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base Directive Proposal (hereafter CCCTB Directive Proposal).1  
 Being initiated since the early 2000’s, the proposed CCCTB system originally 
aims to provide a harmonized corporate tax base on a group basis in order to re-
duce high compliance costs for multinational taxpayers within the EU. The 
CCCTB Directive Proposal is part of the EU internal market development, aiming 
to create a more business friendly environment, attract more economic activities 
and stimulate free movement within the European Union consequently. Moreo-
ver, the CCCTB Directive Proposal would replace the current bilateral treaties be-
tween the EU Member States and adopt a harmonized formula to share the taxing 
powers between Member States. The CCCTB Directive Proposal also provides a 
cross-border loss-offsetting mechanism: qualified group members throughout the 
EU can offset their profits and losses with each other. Adopting CCCTB is ex-
pected to encourage more active cross-border activities, because companies will 
no longer need to worry that their foreign losses cannot be fully offset. In short, 
CCCTB was originally designed to provide convenience and benefits for multina-
tional taxpayers. 
 The BEPS discussions have added new aspects to the CCCTB development 
and led to a paradigm shift. EU legislators are more aware of multinationals’ ag-
gressive tax planning behaviors, so now they also expect that the CCCTB can play 
a role in combating tax avoidance.2 Ideally speaking, the CCCTB Directive Pro-
posal, once adopted, should be able to mitigate BEPS problems as well. When 
CCCTB harmonizes EU Member States’ corporate tax base, disparities due to dif-
ferent national tax laws would be largely reduced. Moreover, since CCCTB is a 
 
1. The European Commission at their official has published the development and legislative 
record of the CCCTB and CCTB see European Commission, »Common Consolidated Corpo-
rate Tax Base (CCCTB)« <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-
tax/common-consolidated-corporate-tax-base-ccctb_en> accessed 25 June 2018. 
2. The paradigm shift of CCCTB, see Shafi U. Khan Niazi, »Re-Launch of the proposal for a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) in the EU: A Shift in Paradigm« (2017) 
44 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 293-314.  
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group consolidation taxation system and transections within a group are record-
ed and filed altogether, mismatches would also be eliminated.  
 However, the ideal does not always match the reality. Even in a harmonized 
supranational tax system such as CCCTB, there are still manipulation possibili-
ties. The loss-offsetting rule of the CCCTB Directive Proposal would be an exam-
ple of such a possibility. This might sound pessimistic, but it is undeniable that 
after the proposed reform under the CCCTB, the opportunity of manipulating 
losses could still exist and take place in a different form. 
 In this paper, the research focuses on the loss treatments under the CCCTB Di-
rective Proposal and newly emerging problems. This paper analyzes the less-
intuitive scenario of Lisa De Simone, Kenneth J. Klassen, and Jeri K. Seidman’s re-
search, »Unprofitable Affiliates and Income Shifting Behavior«,3 on shifting prof-
its to loss-making subsidiaries in a high tax rate jurisdiction, in order to offset the 
losses in that jurisdiction. De Simone et al. argue that losses at a high tax rate ju-
risdiction can effectively offset more profits than the losses at a low tax rate juris-
diction. This is the so-called Shifting-To-Losses scenario. This scenario is far less 
discussed than the following well-recognized two scenarios: (1) shifting profits to 
the low tax rate jurisdiction to reduce the overall tax burden4 and (2) purchasing 
loss-making entities and making use of the seller’s pre-existing losses in order re-
duce the buyer’s overall tax burden.5 So far De Simone et al. have made impres-
sive progress regarding manipulation of losses, and other scholars have tested 
their claim by different set of data. It would be meaningful to test and to apply 
their theory and argument to a specific legal instrument, such as CCCTB. The aim 
of this paper is a dialogue and an echo to the work from De Simone et al.: their 
research concludes that the less-intuitive scenario of profits shifting to a high tax 
rate jurisdiction for the purpose does exist; and the research of this paper shows 
that the findings of De Simone et al. are consistent with the operation of loss-
offsetting rules of the CCCTB Proposal. Since we both have the consensus on the 
existence of such a problem, we will need to think of a feasible solution as the 
next step. 
 The research questions of this paper are: how the losses off-setting rules under 
the CCCTB Directive Proposal can be used to conduct the scenario of Shifting-To-
Losses and what the feasible solutions should be. The research method is, first to 
analyze the specific loss-offsetting rules in the current CCCTB proposal, explore 
the opportunities to shift the losses in the formulary apportionment system, and, 
second, to check if the theory of De Simone et al is also consistent with these op-
portunities derived from the CCCTB. This paper revisits the research findings 
 
3. Lisa De Simone, Kenneth J. Klassen and Jeri K. Seidman, »Unprofitable Affiliates and In-
come Shifting Behavior« (2017) 92 The Accounting Review 113-36.  
4. ibid. 
5. See Section 3.5 of this paper. 
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that multinationals shift their profits and activities to relative high tax rate juris-
dictions when there are utilized losses in these jurisdictions. This empirical data is 
collected and analyzed by accounting and economic scholars. Then, this paper, 
from the normative view of the legal discipline, analyzes the current CCCTB Di-
rective Proposal and discusses how the current CCCTB Directive Proposal could 
be used to conduct the »shift-to-losses strategy« and how it should be improved. 
In other words, such a research method includes an interdisciplinary element: 
making use of the findings from accounting and economics scholars, to find out 
possible unexpected weakness of a tax law reform project, such as CCCTB. It is a 
risky attempt, but it would be meaningful to start such academic dialogue: to »re-
form« a tax reform proposal.  
 The structure of the paper is designed as follows: Section 2 introduces the the-
ory and empirical data regarding the Shifting-To-Losses scenario conducted by 
multinational corporate groups. I will briefly summarize the main findings of De 
Simone et al. as well as an earlier research paper published by the OECD regard-
ing aggressive tax planning via manipulating losses. Section 3 introduces the 
main relevant features of the CCCTB Directive Proposal, specifically the losses-
offsetting rule for group termination and business reorganization and how these 
rules can be used to conduct the Shifting-To-Losses scenario. I will also explain 
how the CCCTB Directive Proposal fails to combat such a scenario and what solu-
tions the current CCCTB Proposal has tried to adopt. In Section 4, after confirm-
ing the existing possibility of a Shifting-To-Losses scenario under CCCTB, I sug-
gest a feasible solution, partially inspired by the Council’s discussions on the 
CCCTB Directive Proposal previously. Section 5 concludes.  
2. The Theory And Empirical Evidence of a »Shifting-To-
Losses« Scenario 
When it comes to »profit-shifting« in the context of international taxation, it is 
quite intuitive to think of shifting profits or income from a high tax rate jurisdic-
tion to a low tax rate jurisdiction. However, more and more studies indicate that, 
losses can play a role in the tax planning scenarios, but such scenarios are less ex-
plored. The OECD has published a research paper in 2011,6 describing the one of 
the various schemes: »shifting profits to a loss-making party«. 
 The findings of De Simone et al. have gone a step further. They first explore 
the pre-existing literature7 on tax-motivated income shifting behaviors. They find 
out that the previous research has discussed the scenario of shifting profits to a 
 
6. OECD, Corporate Loss Utilisation through Aggressive Tax Planning (OECD Publishing 2011) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264119222-en> accessed 10 December 2018, 52. 
7. De Simone, Klassen and Seidman (n 3).  
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low tax rate jurisdiction and provided ample empirical evidence, such as work 
from Hines and Rice, as well as Dharmapala. Hines and Rice8 developed a model 
of using tax havens where tax rates are low or nil, to shift income. Dharmapala 
has used Hines and Rice’s model as a general setting of multinational income 
shifting.9 
 However, the previous research does not touch much upon the responses of 
multinationals to the losses which might trigger the scenario of shifting profits to 
high tax rate jurisdictions to make use of the losses there. It was not completely 
clear how the losses will play a role in multinationals’ tax planning behaviors, 
though there are some works10 affirming that losses do influence multinationals’ 
behaviors. This is where the research of De Simone et al. has proceeded. De 
Simone et al. follow the Cobb-Douglas’ profit prediction model and take more 
than 50,000 European affiliate’s data to observe these affiliates’ reported profits. 
Their hypotheses are: multinationals will have a strategy to shift profits from 
profitable affiliates (in relatively low tax rate jurisdictions) to loss-making affili-
ates (in relatively high tax rate jurisdictions) in order to reduce their global overall 
tax burden, even though conducting such strategy also involve costs. They test 
such hypothesis and consider the costs from conducting such a strategy. Their re-
sults are consistent with their hypotheses. That is to say, their results suggest that 
the scenario of Shifting-To-Losses scenario does exist.11  
 The data of De Simone et al. show that in practice, in addition to shifting prof-
its to low-tax rate jurisdictions, multinational groups also shift profits from prof-
itable affiliates to unprofitable affiliates in order to make use of losses in the high 
tax jurisdiction, despite the costs of conducting such a scenario. Their findings al-
so provide evidence that, even if the loss-making situation of an affiliate might be 
temporary, multinationals still have the incentive to conduct such a »shift to loss« 
strategy. As Lisa De Simone indicated in an interview herself: so far, the 
knowledge regarding losses manipulation is still quite limited, and thus the real 
 
8. James R. Hines Jr. and Eric M. Rice, »Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American 
Business« (1994) 109 Quarterly Journal of Economics 149-82.  
9. Dhammika Dharmapala, »What Do We Know about Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Re-
view of the Empirical Literature« (2014) 35 Fiscal Studies: The Journal of Applied Public 
Economics 421-48.  
10. As De Simone et al. reviewed, such research work regarding losses and multinationals’ be-
havior, includes the relation between carry-forward losses and debt issuing behavior, see Jef-
frey K. MacKie-Mason, »Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions?« (1990) 45 Journal 
of Finance 1471-93; the relation between loss-carry forward and the bonus depreciation elec-
tion behavior, see Jesse Edgerton, »Investment incentives and corporate tax asymmetries« 
(2010) 94 Journal of Public Economics 936-52. 
11. De Simone, Klassen and Seidman (n 3) 130. 
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effect of BEPS is underestimated and that »corporate tax avoidance is bigger than 
you think«.12 
 Corporate losses can be manipulated in various ways as the OECD research 
paper already described in 2011. The findings of De Simone et al. in 2016, have 
confirmed the existence of the less intuitive scenario Shifting-To-Losses based on 
their empirical evidence. This scenario is actually logical. The loss offsetting pro-
cess can be seen as making some part of income subject to the zero-tax rate. It is a 
strong incentive. Shifting profits to offset the losses incurred in a relatively high 
tax rate jurisdiction will have more benefits because the offsetting losses of a high 
tax rate jurisdiction compensate more than offsetting losses in a relatively low tax 
rate jurisdiction.  
 In addition to the findings from De Simone et al., Hopland et al., test the same 
claim of Shifting-To-Losses by using a different set of data, involving 300 Norwe-
gian companies from 1998 to 2005.13 Hopland et al. affirm that the Shifting-To-
Losses strategy of increasing the economic activities/the tax base in a high tax 
rate jurisdiction in order to utilize the losses incurred by affiliates in that jurisdic-
tion. More specifically, Hopland et al. have found that companies make use of 
transfer pricing practices to achieve the Shifting-To-Losses strategy, not by creat-
ing the internal debts. In this regard, the Shifting-To-Losses strategy is a long-
standing scenario, and it is inter-related with transfer pricing practices. 
 The implications from the work of De Simone et al. and Hopland et al. for EU 
policy makers and legislators are clear: where the scenario of shifting profits to 
low-tax rate jurisdictions are concerned, we need to be aware of the scenario of 
shifting profits to high-tax rate jurisdictions. Section 3 of this paper will further 
indicate how the current CCCTB Directive Proposal, is consistent with the re-
search findings of De Simone et al. The CCCTB Directive Proposal does provide 
an opportunity to conduct Shifting-to-Losses, but EU legislators have not been 
aware of this opportunity. 
 
12. See the blog post of Stanford Graduate School of Business, Lee Simmons, »Why Corporate 
Tax Avoidance Is Bigger Than You Think: An accounting expert examines the impact of new 
rules on income shifting« Stanford Business (Stanford 24 May 2016) <www.gsb.stanford. 
edu/insights/why-corporate-tax-shifting-bigger-you-think> accessed 24 June 2018. 
13. Arnt O. Hopland and others, »Flexibility in Income Shifting under Losses« (2018) 93 The Ac-
counting Review 163-83. 
  THE STRATEGY OF SHIFTING-TO-LOSSES ... 7 
3. The Shifting-To-Losses Opportunity Under The CCCTB  
3.1. The Overview Of The CCCTB System: A Three-Factor Formulary 
Apportionment 
The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) is an ambitious project 
initiated by European Commission.14 After many working group meetings, in 
2011, the CCCTB Directive Proposal was released for the first time. The three 
main features of the CCCTB are: Common (a harmonized corporate tax base at 
the EU level); Consolidated (a group taxation which consolidates all qualifying 
group members) and Formulary Apportionment (a pre-decided formula dividing 
the common consolidated tax base). By the metaphor of »a pie and a knife«, a 
multinational group active in different EU Member States can file their harmo-
nized consolidated tax base from all qualifying group members from different EU 
Member States, and such consolidated tax base is like a big pie, jointly contribut-
ed by all group members. The formula is like a knife to decide the share/a piece 
of the pie which is apportioned to each group member.15  
 Due to the consolidation, losses and profits from all group members will au-
tomatically be offset with each other. Therefore, adopting the consolidated tax 
base has the embedded benefit of cross-border loss offsetting. With the same met-
aphor of the whole consolidated pie and the knife, the process of loss offsetting is 
to make the consolidated pie smaller or to make the apportioned piece smaller. 
 The »knife«, the CCCTB sharing formula, consists of three equally weighted 
factors: the sales factor, the asset factor and the labour factor.16 Each factor is a ra-
tio, and the denominator is the whole group’s factor items, and the numerator is 
the factor items, which can be attributed to the group member.  
Therefore, each group member’s apportioned share17 of the pie would be:  
  
 
14. The legislation record of the development of CCCTB is published at the European Commis-
sion’s website (n 1).  
15. The comprehensive introduction of CCCTB, see Christoph Spengel and York Zc ̈llkau (eds), 
Common Corporate Tax Base (CC(C)TB) and Determination of Taxable Income: An International 
Comparison (Springer 2012) discussions on losses at C.4; Christiana HJI Panayi, »The Com-
mon Consolidated Corporate Tax Base and the UK Tax System« (2011) The Institute For Fis-
cal Studies TLRC Discussion Paper No. 9, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1809568> accessed 9 
December 2019; discussions prior to 2011 CCCTB Directive Proposal on losses, see Saturnina 
Moreno González and José Alberto Sanz Diaz-Palacios, »The Common Consolidated Corpo-
rate Tax Base: Treatment of Losses« in Michael Lang and others (eds) Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (Linde Verlag 2008). 
16. The labour factor consists of two sub-factors: the head counts of employees and the amount 
of payroll. Both factors are equally weighted as 50% in the labour factor. 
17. Article 28 of 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal. 
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the consolidated tax base  
× (ଵଷ ൈ
௧௛௘ ௠௘௠௕௘௥ᇲ௦௦௔௟௘௦
௚௥௢௨௣ ௦௔௟௘௦ ൅
ଵ
ଷ ൈ
௧௛௘ ௠௘௠௕௘௥ᇲ௦ ௔௦௦௘௧௦
௚௥௢௨௣ ௔௦௦௘௧௦ ൅
ଵ
ଷ ൈ
௧௛௘ ௠௘௠௕௘௥ᇲ௦ ௟௔௕௢௨௥
௚௥௢௨௣ ௟௔௕௢௨௥  ) 
Each group member’s actual amount of tax due is the apportioned share multi-
plied by the national corporate tax rate applicable to that group member.18  
 As to the selection of weighting factors under the CCCTB, there have been 
some debates, whether the CCCTB should follow the trend of the USA to adopt 
the single sales factor.19 Weiner20 endorses a three-factor formula, and the Europe-
an Commission is of a similar opinion. There are also other supportive views on a 
three-factor formula. For example, Mayer21 argues that, based on the benefit prin-
ciple, the sales factor represents the customers’ market side, whilst the asset factor 
and the labour factor represent the production side. Furthermore, the European 
Commission also argues that a three-actor formula would be less vulnerable to 
abuse because it is too difficult to abuse every factor at the same time.22 In any 
case, even though the European Commission has tried to prevent possible abu-
sive scenarios such as those that have already taken place in the States. The cur-
rent CCCTB Directive Proposal is not perfect. In fact, even in the sales factor, 
which is arguably harder to manipulate,23 there are still possibilities to inflate the 
ratio if the sales factor is not properly designed.24 From formulary apportionment 
 
18. Article 45 of 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal: »The tax liability of each group member shall 
be the outcome of the application of the national tax rate to the apportioned share, adjusted 
in accordance with Article 44, and further reduced with the deductions provided for in Arti-
cle 25«. 
19. For example, Llopis argues that the CCCB should be a single sales factor formula. See 
Estefanía López Llopis, »Formulary Apportionment in the European Union« (2017) 45 Inter-
tax 631–41. 
20. Joann Martens Weiner, »CCCTB and Formulary Apportionment: The European Commission 
Finds the Right Formula« in Dennis Weber (ed), CCCTB Selected Issues (Kluwer Law Interna-
tional 2012). 
21. Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market (IBFD 2009) 206. Mayer endors-
es a three-factor formula of payroll, gross receipts and tangible property based on the benefit 
principle. He is skeptical with the amount of employees as a weighting factor. 
22. See the CCCTB working document European Commission, »Common Consolidated Corpo-
rate Tax Base Working Group« <https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/ 
files/docs/body/ccctbwp060_en.pdf> accessed 10 December 2018, No.60, paragraph 63.  
23. See Maarten de Wilde, »Tax Competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB Di-
rective a Solution?« (2014) 7 Erasmus Law Review 24-38. 
24. For example, Shu-Chien Chen, »Tax Avoidance in the Sales Factor: Comparison between the 
CCCTB and USA’s Formulary Apportionment Taxation« (2017) 3 Indian Journal of Tax Law 
1-27.  
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experiences in the USA, there are still quite a few possibilities to manipulate the 
sharing formula.25 
 According to the EU law legislative procedure requirement, the CCCTB Di-
rective Proposal must be approved by the Council of the European Union, unan-
imously.26 Such unanimity has not been achieved until now (2018), due to politi-
cal sensitivity. In different Council presidencies from 2011 to 2015, there had been 
different compromise proposals being produced, but none of them were ap-
proved. Despite the rocky process, the Council still affirms the necessity of adopt-
ing the CCCTB, especially as a response to the BEPS campaign. In 2016, the Euro-
pean Commission withdrew the 2011 CCCTB Directive Proposal and re-proposed 
two separate Directive Proposals. The first one is the 2016 Common Corporate 
Tax Base (CCTB) Directive Proposal and the second one is the 2016 CCCTB Di-
rective.27 Once being accepted, the 2016 CCTB Directive will be implemented first 
to achieve a harmonized corporate tax base. The 2016 CCCTB Directive will be 
implemented consequently to achieve a consolidated corporate tax base with the 
formulary apportionment mechanism, which will replace the current bilateral tax 
treaties between EU Member States regarding corporate tax. The 2016 CCCTB Di-
rective, in fact, copies the 2011 CCCTB Directive mostly, regarding consolidation 
and formulary apportionment, without major modifications.  
 Since it requires unanimity in the Council to adopt the CCCTB Directive ac-
cording to the TFEU, it is not easy to achieve such political consensus. After issu-
ing the CCTB and CCCTB Directives, some national parliaments of EU Member 
States’ reactions are also negative so they issue reasoned opinions, trying to in-
voke »the yellow card procedure« to challenge the legitimacy of the CCTB and 
 
25. Hellerstein analyzes the tax planning scenarios on the weighing factors from American ex-
periences, see Walter Hellerstein, »Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportion-
ment Provisions: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly« in Dennis Weber (ed), CCCTB Selected Is-
sues (Kluwer Law International 2012); Walter Hellerstein, »Formulary Apportionment in the 
EU and the US: A Comparative Perspective on the Sharing Mechanism of the Proposed 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base« in Ana Paula Dourado (ed), Movement of Per-
sons and Tax Mobility in the EU: Changing Winds (IBFD 2014). Not only the sales factor, but al-
so the asset factor and the labour factor can be manipulated. Examples based on the 2011 
CCCTB Directive Proposal, see de Wilde, »Tax Competetition within the European Union – 
Is the CCTB Directive a Solution?« (n 23). These manipulation opportunities still exist under 
the 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal, see Maarten de Wilde, »Tax Competition Within the 
European Union Revisited: Is the Relaunched CCCTB a Solution?« in Dennis Weber and Jan 
van de Streek (eds), The EU Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: Critical Analysis (Wolters 
Kluwer 2017). 
26. Article 115 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the full text is available at 
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012E/TXT> accessed 9 
December 2018.  
27. The overview of the latest of CCTB and CCCTB, see Daniel Gutmann and Emmanuel Rain-
geard de la Blge tit i re, »CC(C)TB and International Taxation« (2017) 26 EC Tax Review 233-
45. 
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the CCCTB Directive Proposal.28 National parliaments from small Member States, 
such as the Netherlands and Ireland, are still skeptical.29 Nonetheless, when we 
read into these reasoned opinions, we still see conditional support of 
CCCTB/CCTB, even in a negative reasoned opinion. For example, the Dutch 
lower parliament’s opinion simply collects all different opinions and aspects from 
different parties, and thus, in such a piece of opinion, we can also see the positive 
support from several Dutch parties.30 Moreover, other national parliaments sub-
mit their positive opinion on the CCCTB, such as Austria,31 so it would not be 
completely impossible to adopt the CCTB/CCCTB for EU Member States, be-
cause CC(C)TB could be useful to contribute to combat BEPS and tax avoidance 
problems. 
 Briefly speaking, CCCTB has the ambition to reduce compliance costs and 
provide a cross-border loss offsetting mechanism. Ideally, implementing CCCTB 
will make the corporate tax system in the EU more neutral to multinational tax-
 
28. The yellow card procedure is provided in TFEU Article 5 (3) in combination with Protocol 
no.2. Specific conditions see Rita Szudoczky, »Is the CCCTB Proposal in line with the Princi-
ple of Subsidiarity?« in Dennis Weber (ed), CCCTB Selected Issues (Kluwer Law International 
2012). 
29. As to the parliaments of EU Member States’ reaction to 2016 CCCTB Directive, see Jan van 
de Streek, »Some Introductory Remarks on the Relaunched CCTB/CCCTB Proposals from a 
Policy Perspective« in Dennis Weber and Jan van de Streek (eds), The EU Common Consolidat-
ed Corporate Tax Base: Critical Analysis (Wolters Kluwer 2017). As to the parliaments of EU 
Member States’ reaction to 2011 CCCTB Directive, see Szudoczky (n 28) 125. As Szudoczky 
analyzes, the 13 negative reasoned opinions submitted by parliaments of the Member States, 
have the common pattern: these reasoned opinions are formulated as being more similar to 
discuss the proportionality of the element of consolidation of CCCTB Directive Proposal, in-
stead of arguing the two tests indicated in the impact assessment. Member States are arguing 
the same objectives, including eliminating compliance costs from national tax law disparities 
and lowering high transfer-pricing costs, should be achieved in a less intrusive way for 
Member States. 
30. All the reasoned opinion written in English submitted by national parliaments are archived 
at European Parliament’s official legislative observatory website, under the procedure file 
number 2016/0336(CNS), search from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/home/ 
home.do> accessed 13 September 2018. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ 
ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2016/0336(SLP)#tab-0> accessed 9 December 2018. 
The Dutch parliament’s reasoned opinion has included some positive thoughts, from the 
party PvDA, on the CCCTB. 
31. It is worth noticing that, while several national parliaments submit reasoned opinion ex-
pressing their concerns about CCTB/CCCTB, there are other Member States submitting pos-
itive opinion contributions, including Austria, House of Commons in UK, etc. More specifi-
cally, the opinion from Austria parliament is archived at <http://www.europarl.europa. 
eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/parlements_nationaux/com/2016/0683/AT_BUND
ESRAT_CONT1-COM(2016)0683_EN.pdf> and the opinion from House of Commons in UK 
is archived at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/parlements 
_nationaux/com/2016/0683/UK_HOUSE-OF-COMMONS_CONT1-COM(2016) 
0683_EN.pdf> accessed 9 December 2018.  
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payers’ economic activities. Multinationals will not need to deal with great dis-
parities of Member States’ tax laws, so they will not be deterred from conducting 
cross-border activities; their profits and losses can also be offset effectively even 
when they are incurred in different EU Member States. Therefore, the loss offset-
ting of CCCTB will make the tax law more consistent with taxpayers’ economic 
reality. 
3.2. The Source of The Problem: The Un-Harmonized Corporate Tax Rate  
Despite of all the efforts to combat tax avoidance by harmonizing EU Member 
States corporate tax base, the embedded incentive under the CCCTB Directive 
Proposal to shift profits is due to un-harmonized corporate tax rates.32 Therefore, 
as long as national tax rates are still different, multinationals still have the incen-
tive to conduct tax planning to make use of the disparity in order to minimize 
their tax burden legally.  
 Adopting a consolidation system combined with the formulary apportion-
ment, like CCCTB, is not the panacea to aggressive planning. CCCTB still faces 
the aggressive planning in the new form of shifting weighting factors of the for-
mula, in order to strategically plan the apportioned share.33 In other words, it is 
still possible for multinationals to shift their asset or labour factor, to change the 
result of applying the sharing formula, as discussed in Section 3.1 above. 
 Practically speaking, it is impossible to expect a harmonized or uniform tax 
rate at the EU level. Therefore, we need to live with such inherent and imperfect 
features of the system and think of feasible solutions. In Section 3.3 I will demon-
strate that the CCCTB can also give rise to the Shifting-To-Losses scenario, in Sec-
tion 3.4 I will further discuss the scenario of strategically apportioning the losses, 
also possibly to a high tax rate jurisdiction. I identify the scenario of apportioning 
losses under the CCCTB system as »Shifting-To-Losses 2.0«, and it can be regard-
ed as a variation from the scenario of Shifting-To-Losses. In Section 3.5, there are 
explanations why Shifting-To-Losses scenarios cannot be easily solved by the 
general anti-avoidance rule as such. 
3.3. The Losses-Offsetting Rules Under The CCCTB Provide Shifting to 
Pre-Entry Losses Opportunities 
The rationale of loss offsetting rules under the CCCTB is actually quite simple 
and following a group taxation rationale. Losses and profits of all qualifying 
group members34 are consolidated with each other and offset automatically.35  
 
32. Preamble of 2016 CCTB and 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal. 
33. Antony Ting, »Multilateral Formulary Apportionment Model – A Reality Check« (2010) 25 
Australian Tax Forum 95-136.  
34. Only qualifying subsidiaries can be in the group. The requirements of the qualification of a 
group member are provided in Article 5 of 2016 CCTB Directive Proposal: »1. A qualifying 
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 CCCTB does not have the retrospective effect, and therefore the pre-entry loss-
es that are incurred before the CCCTB enters into force will still be subject to na-
tional rules or the 2016 CCTB Directive Proposal.36 Pre-entry losses that are in-
curred by a company before the company joins the CCCTB group, may not be 
consolidated with the profits of other group members either. This is the so-called 
»ring-fencing effect«.37 These two types of pre-entry losses can only be offset 
against its group members’ apportioned share of the consolidated tax base. In 
other words, the CCCTB’s cross-border group loss-offsetting benefit is not appli-
cable to these pre-entry losses.  
 Although the pre-entry losses are ring-fenced, i.e. they cannot be offset directly 
against the consolidated tax base of the whole group, the ring-fencing mechanism 
does not eliminate tax-planning opportunities. Although not offset against con-
solidated tax base, the pre-entry losses can offset the apportioned share of the 
group member. Multinational group taxpayers can shift their weighting factors to 
adjust their sharing formula after they join the CCCTB group for the purpose of 
optimally setting off their pre-entry losses. When pre-entry losses are incurred in 
a relatively high tax rate jurisdiction, offsetting these losses represents reducing 
more tax burden.38 There is still an incentive to shift factors to these jurisdictions 
 
subsidiary means every immediate and lower-tier subsidiary in which the parent company 
holds the following rights: (a) it has a right to exercise more than 50 % of the voting rights; 
and (b) it has an ownership right amounting to more than 75 % of the subsidiary’s capital or 
it owns more than 75 % of the rights giving entitlement to profit. 2. For the purpose of calcu-
lating the thresholds referred to in paragraph 1 in relation to lower-tier subsidiaries, the fol-
lowing rules shall be applied: (a) once the voting-right threshold is reached in respect of a 
subsidiary, the parent company shall be considered to hold 100 % of such rights; (b) entitle-
ment to profit and ownership of capital shall be calculated by multiplying the interests held, 
directly and indirectly, in subsidiaries at each tier. Ownership rights amounting to 75 % or 
less held directly or indirectly by the parent company, including rights in companies resi-
dent in a third country, shall also be taken into account in the calculation«. 
35. Article 7 of 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal: »Effect of consolidation. 1. The tax bases of all 
members of a group shall be added together into a consolidated tax base. 2. Where the con-
solidated tax base is negative, the loss shall be carried forward and be set off against the next 
positive consolidated tax base. Where the consolidated tax base is positive, it shall be appor-
tioned in accordance with Chapter VIII«. 
36. Article 15 of 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal: »Pre-entry losses. Unrelieved losses that have 
been incurred by a group member in accordance with national corporate tax law or Directive 
2016/xx/EU (ie the CCTB Directive once adopted) before the rules of this Directive became 
applicable to that group member may be set off against the apportioned share of that group 
member if and to the extent that this is provided for under the national corporate tax law or 
Directive 2016/xx/EU«. 
37. The brief introduction of the ring-fence mechanism, see Jan van de Streek, »The CCCTB 
Concept of Consolidation and the Rules on Entering a Group« (2012) 40 Intertax 24–32.  
38. Borg also observes this: »If Member States B & C for example have higher tax rates, the loss-
es would be more beneficial for the group if utilized in those Member States against future 
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to effectively utilize these pre-entry losses subject to a high tax rate. The taxpayers 
can even reduce their tax burden more than the scenario of shifting fac-
tors/profits to offset losses incurred in a relatively low tax rate jurisdiction. This 
scenario is exactly what De Simone et al. already observed in their empirical re-
search, summarized in Section 2 above. In other words, even under the current 
CCCTB proposal, the Shifting-To-Losses scenario can also exist. 
 The ring-fencing mechanism cannot prevent the Shifting-To-Losses scenario. It 
is because the scenario of shifting weighting factors from its appearance just looks 
like the normal operation of formulary apportionment. The ring-fence mecha-
nism will not influence this result. Unless there are further indications of abuse of 
law or shifting factors mainly for the purpose of avoiding tax, such a scenario is 
presumed to be legitimate. The ring-fencing mechanism is actually toothless to 
combat a Shifting-To-Losses scenario. 
3.4. Shifting-To-Losses 2.0: Apportioning The Consolidated Losses 
Strategically 
It is not only the pre-entry losses that can be offset strategically, but also the con-
solidated losses. Such »Shifting-To-Losses 2.0« can take place under the CCCTB 
in two circumstances: upon group termination and upon business re-
organization, when the consolidation losses can be apportioned.  
3.4.1. Apportionment of Consolidated Losses upon Group Termination  
According to Article 1639 of the 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal, when a group 
terminates, the losses incurred by the consolidated group, will be apportioned ac-
cording to the single final year of the sharing formula of the group. Therefore, 
multinationals can use this strategy to shift their weighting factors, to design a 
preferable formula for apportioning their consolidated losses.  
 As to group termination, Article 18 provides the rules for these apportioned 
losses.40 Upon group termination, there might be three types of situations that 
need addressing:  
 
taxable profits there«. See Jeanette Calleja Borg, »The Tax Treatment of Losses under the 
Proposed Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Directive« (2013) 41 Intertax 581–87. 
39. Article 16 of 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal: »Termination of a group. The tax year of a 
group shall end when the group is dissolved. The consolidated tax base and any unrelieved 
losses of the group shall be allocated to each group member in accordance with Chapter 
VIII, on the basis of the values of the apportionment factors in the tax year of termination«. 
40. Article 18 of 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal: »Losses after the group terminates. Following 
termination of a group, losses of that group shall be treated as follows: (a) the losses of a tax-
payer who opts for applying the rules of Directive 2016/xx/EU shall be carried forward and 
be set off in accordance with Article 41 of that Directive; (b) the losses of a taxpayer joining 
another group shall be carried forward and be set off against the relevant group member’s 
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(1) When the group member still opts into the CCTB system, then the relevant 
quantitative restrictions of CCTB will apply.41  
(2) When the group member joins another group, the apportioned losses will be 
carried forward but also ring-fenced as the pre-entry losses in the new group. 
All restrictions under the CCCTB will also apply.  
(3) When the group member returns to the national tax law regime, these appor-
tioned losses will be subject to the national tax law, as if these losses had in-
curred under that national tax law. 
In each situation, there are tax-planning opportunities existing. It can be imagined 
that, tax payers might tend to apportion losses to group members in the high tax 
rate jurisdiction or the group members which will still be subject to the CCCTB, 
since the indefinite carry forward period of the CCCTB is much more favorable 
than most national tax laws. 
3.4.2. Apportionment of Consolidated Losses upon Business Re-organization 
In case of business re-organization between two or more groups, the CCCTB Di-
rective Proposal provides special rules for loss offsetting. It is provided in Article 
2342 of 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal.43 As the main rule, when there are two or 
more CCCTB groups merging or conducting share sales or share exchange and 
 
apportioned share, subject to the restrictions of Article 41(3) of Directive 2016/xx/EU; (c) the 
losses of a taxpayer returning to national corporate tax law shall be carried forward and be 
set off in accordance with the national corporate tax law becoming applicable, as if those 
losses had arisen while the taxpayer was subject to that law«. 
41. See Section 3.5.1 of this paper. 
42. Article 23 of 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal: »Treatment of losses where a business reorgan-
ization takes place between two or more groups. 1. Where, as a result of a business reorgani-
zation, one or more groups, or two or more group members, become part of another group, 
any unrelieved losses of the previously existing group or groups shall be allocated to each of the 
group members in accordance with Chapter VIII and on the basis of the factors as they stand 
at the end of the tax year in which the business reorganization takes place. Unrelieved losses of the 
previously existing group or groups shall be carried forward for future years. Where two or 
more group members become part of another group, no unrelieved losses of the first group 
shall be allocated as referred to in subparagraph 1, provided that the joint value of the asset 
and labor factors of the departing group members amounts to less than 20 % of the value of 
these two factors for the entire first group. 2. Where two or more principal taxpayers merge 
within the meaning of points (i) and (ii) of Article 2(a) of Council Directive 2009/133/EC, 
any unrelieved losses of a group shall be allocated to its members in accordance with Chap-
ter VIII, on the basis of the factors as they stand at the end of the tax year in which the mer-
ger takes place. Unrelieved losses shall be carried forward for future years«. (emphasis add-
ed).  
43. It should be clarified that in case that business reorganization takes place between group 
members within a group (which is regulated by Article 22 of 2016 CCCTB Directive), in 
principle it should not give rise to any profits or losses, and therefore an intra-group busi-
ness reorganization is regarded as fiscally non-existent, not in the scope of this section. 
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making one whole group or some group members of one group affiliate to anoth-
er group, this is a type of business reorganization between groups. In such cases, 
the unrelieved losses of these groups will be apportioned according to each 
group’s formula of the year of business re-organization. This rule of apportion-
ment also applies to the situation when two or more principal taxpayers merge. 
From the perspective of the new big group after the merger, these apportioned 
losses become each group member’s pre-consolidated losses. 
 The second part of Article 23(1) of the 2016 CCCTB provides the exception to 
the main rule of business reorganization. When there are two or more departing 
members, the joint value of the asset and labor factors only involve less than 20% 
of the value of these two factors for their original group, the departing members 
cannot take away their share of consolidated losses. In other words, when two or 
more members depart, where the asset and labor factors merely represent less 
than 20 % of the value of the original group, the legal effect is the same as the 
leaving rule, i.e. consolidated losses will stay at the original group.  
 Where two or more group members become part of another group, no unre-
lieved losses of the first group shall be allocated as referred to in subparagraph 1, 
provided that the joint value of the asset and labor factors of the departing group 
members amounts to less than 20% of the value of these two factors for the entire 
first group. 
3.4.3. The Strategy of Combing The Group Member Leaving Rule  
As indicated above, loss-offsetting under the CCCTB follows the consolidation 
method. Losses incurred during the consolidated group period, can be offset 
against profits from other group members. When one loss-making group member 
leaves the group, the leaving member may not take its losses incurred in the con-
solidated group period away at all. Following the same rationale, Article 21 of 
2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal clearly provides this: »No losses shall be attributed 
to a group member leaving a group«. Article 21 demonstrates that CCCTB emphasiz-
es group thinking: losses incurred at the group level should »stay« at the group. 
 When the leaving rule is combined with the business reorganization rule, a 
manipulation scenario immediately arises: when two CCCTB groups (A and B) 
aim to conduct transactions to achieve business re-organization. For example 
Group A purchasing 100% of the shares of three group members (b1, b2, b3) from 
Group B, they can choose to first let go of one group member (b1) and let all the 
consolidated losses incurred by this group member, »stay« in the group. Follow-
ing this, Group B can let go of the other two group members later. The conse-
quence of letting go one group member first is obvious; the consolidated losses 
will not be apportioned to the first leaving member (b1), and will stay at the 
group and be apportioned to all the remaining members of Group B, based on the 
formula of the year of letting go the second two group members (b2 and b3).  
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 By combining the leaving rule under the CCCTB Directive Proposal, two 
groups can achieve the effect of »concentrating losses« to specific jurisdictions 
while they conduct business re-organization. Taxpayers can concentrate the loss-
es and then apportion their consolidated losses strategically. They may apportion 
part of the consolidated losses to high tax rate jurisdictions too. EU legislators are 
not aware of such a planning opportunity. 
3.5. What The Current CC(C) TB Directive Proposals Have Combated and 
Have Not 
3.5.1. Article 41 and Article 42 of 2016 CCTB Directive Proposal: The Scenario of 
Purchasing Loss-Making Companies to Join The Group Is Addressed 
It should be clarified that the EU legislators are not completely ignorant with the 
aggressive tax planning regarding the corporate losses when they were drafting 
the 2016 CCTB Directive Proposal. Article 42 of the 2016 CCTB Directive Proposal 
provides a common tax base, and further provides a temporary and cross-border 
loss-offsetting mechanism with recapture that is applicable between taxpayer 
companies and their »foreign permanent establishments situated in other EU 
Member States and qualifying subsidiaries«.44 The re-capture for loss offsetting 
means that such a loss-offsetting mechanism is merely temporary, because the 
amount of deduction will be recaptured, provided that a loss-making subsidiary 
or permanent establishment (PE) makes no profits after five years since the year 
of loss offsetting. 45 Although the 2016 CCTB Directive Proposal is not a consolida-
 
44. Regarding the loss relief of the 2016 CCTB Directive Proposal, see Bruno da Silva, 
»Cross-Border Loss Relief under the Proposed CCTB Directive« in Dennis Weber and Jan 
van de Streek (eds), The EU Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: Critical Analysis (Wolters 
Kluwer 2017). 
45. Article 42 of CCTB Directive Proposal: »Loss relief and recapture. 1. A resident taxpayer that 
is still profitable after having deducted its own losses pursuant to Article 41 may additional-
ly deduct losses incurred, in the same tax year, by its immediate qualifying subsidiaries, as 
referred to in Article 3(1), or by permanent establishment(s) situated in other Member States. 
This loss relief shall be given for a limited period of time in accordance with paragraphs 3 
and 4 of this Article. 2. The deduction shall be in proportion to the holding of the resident 
taxpayer in its qualifying subsidiaries as referred to in Article 3(1) and full for permanent es-
tablishments. In no case shall the reduction of the tax base of the resident taxpayer result in a 
negative amount. 3. The resident taxpayer shall add back to its tax base, up to the amount 
previously deducted as a loss, any subsequent profits made by its qualifying subsidiaries as 
referred to in Article 3(1) or by its permanent establishments. 4. Losses deducted pursuant to 
paragraphs 1 and 2 shall automatically be reincorporated into the tax base of the resident 
taxpayer in any of the following circumstances: (a) where, at the end of the fifth tax year af-
ter the losses became deductible, no profit has been reincorporated or the reincorporated 
profits do not correspond to the full amount of losses deducted; (b) where the qualifying 
subsidiary as referred to in Article 3(1) is sold, wound up or transformed into a permanent 
establishment; (c) where the permanent establishment is sold, wound up or transformed into 
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tion system, its loss-offsetting mechanism makes it possible to conduct (1) cross-
border loss-offsetting between a resident taxpayer and its PE of another EU 
Member State; (2) loss-offsetting between a resident taxpayer’s domestic and EU-
based qualifying subsidiaries.46 
 In addition to the recapture mechanism in Article 42, the 2016 CCTB Directive 
Proposal provides another restriction to loss-offsetting: Article 41 (3). Article 41(3) 
is designed to combat the specific scenario of »acquiring a continuously loss-
making company to become a qualifying subsidiary«47 in order to reduce the 
overall tax burden. The acquired loss-making company will discontinue its activi-
ties after the acquisition. When a transaction qualifies as this scenario the loss off-
setting, under CCTB, will be rejected. 
 Article 41(3) provides: »Losses incurred by a resident taxpayer or by a perma-
nent establishment of a non- resident taxpayer in previous years shall not be de-
ducted where all of the following conditions are met: 
(a) another company acquires a participation in the taxpayer as a result of which 
the acquired taxpayer becomes a qualifying subsidiary of the acquirer as referred 
to in Article 3; 
(b) there is a major change of activity of the acquired taxpayer, which means that 
the acquired taxpayer discontinues a certain activity which accounted for more 
than [60 %] of its turnover in the previous tax year or embarks on new activi-
ties which amount to more than [60 %] of its turnover in the tax year of their 
introduction or the following tax year«. 
Article 41(3) has a specific target to combat: a taxpayer acquiring a losses-making 
company, to make use of the acquired losses. This is what the CCCTB Directive 
Proposal has combated. Since the target is specific, Article 41(3) still cannot com-
bat the above-mentioned scenarios of a Shifting-To-Losses scenario or Shifting-
To-Losses 2.0. To combat acquiring embedded losses is the traditional idea of 
manipulating losses and Shifting-To-Losses 2.0 falls outside of EU legislators’ im-
agination and prediction. Article 41 (3)’s limited scope can only address the tradi-
tional loss-offsetting manipulation. 
3.5.2. Article 23 of 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal: The Scenario of Small Scale 
Business Re-Organization Is Addressed 
The current proposed loss-offsetting rules under the CCCTB are much more fa-
vorable than national tax laws because the carry-forward period is indefinite. 
 
a subsidiary; (d) where the parent company no longer fulfils the requirements of Article 
3(1)«. 
46. See Article 42 (3) of CCTB Directive Proposal, ibid. 
47. Preamble of 2016 CCTB Directive Proposal, explanation of »Losses«, at p.10; Recital (12). 
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Although the 2016 CCTB Directive Proposal provides loss-offsetting rejection and 
recapture measures as discussed in 3.5.1, these rules do not apply in the CCCTB 
system nor the apportioned losses either.48 In other words, the CCCTB system 
will face different types of loss-offsetting planning scenarios. 
 As indicated above, business reorganization between groups, or business re-
organization involving two group members, in principle will trigger apportion-
ment of consolidation losses. However, a single group member leaving its group 
will not trigger any losses apportionment to the departing member. Then here is 
the question: if two or more members formally leave the group at the same time, 
but the involved labour and assets in the original group do not change much, 
does such a situation also qualify as a business-reorganization and trigger the 
consequence of apportioning the losses? If the answer is affirmative and such a 
situation qualifies as a business-reorganization, it seems to be providing an easy 
opportunity to manipulate and trigger the business-reorganization rule by letting 
go of two or more group members at the same time while the changes of the 
group assets and labour remain very trivial. 
 Therefore, Article 23 of the 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal provides the ex-
ception to the main rule of apportioning the losses. When the business organiza-
tion involves two or more members leaving, but these members only change less 
than 20% of the whole group’s assets and labour, the losses at the group level will 
not be apportioned. In other words, such re-organization will be regarded as the 
same as two or more group members just leaving separately. Therefore, a group 
cannot just make use of the opportunity of letting go small a percentage of labour 
and assets to trigger apportionment of losses. This is also what the CCCTB Di-
rective Proposal has already combated. 
3.5.3. Loopholes Regarding Apportionment of Consolidated Losses  
What the CCCTB and CCTB have combated is the classical scenario of making 
use of built-in losses by purchasing loss-making companies into the group; there-
fore, the counter-measure is the re-capture mechanism. It is logical. Despite the 
fact that the re-capture mechanism is not applicable to the CCCTB Directive, the 
re-capture mechanism is not useful to combating the problem of apportioning the 
losses at all. 
 As to the problems arising from apportioning the losses, only Article 23 of 
2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal can prevent triggering the apportionment. How-
ever, Article 23 of 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal is limited only to when less 
 
48. Article 71 of CCCTB Directive Proposal: »Loss relief and recapture. 1. Article 41 of Directive 
2016/xx/EU on loss relief and recapture shall automatically cease to apply when this Di-
rective comes into force. 2. Transferred losses which have not yet been recaptured when this 
Directive enters into force shall remain with the taxpayer to which they have been trans-
ferred«. (emphasis added).  
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than 20% of the whole group’s assets and labour is changed in the business-
reorganization. As to apportioning the losses in a normal business-reorganization 
or group termination, Article 23 of 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal is not applica-
ble, so it cannot function as a counter-measure. The losses would be apportioned, 
according to the formula of the year of business-reorganization. Since taxpayers 
can expect a business-reorganization, it is also possible to plan the formula of that 
year in advance. 
 In the case of a group shifting profits and activities to a specific jurisdiction to 
change its formula just in order to create a set of losses, we might argue that the 
general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) of the CCCTB system might look useful. 
However, when the scenario is shifting activities or profits to a »high-tax rate« ju-
risdiction, not a low tax rate jurisdiction, it might not be so easy for tax authorities 
to detect this scenario, because it is unconventional and even a bit counter-
intuitive. Therefore, regarding the loss-offsetting mechanism under the CCCTB 
Directive Proposal in the case of group termination and business re-organization, 
there is a loophole so that the Shifting-To-Losses 2.0 problem arises. A tailored so-
lution is then necessary. 
3.5.4. Why the Safeguard Clause and General Anti-Avoidance Rule Cannot Solve The 
Problem of Shifting-To-Losses Scenarios 
It should be noted that, in the CCTB and CCCTB Directive Proposals, there are 
two instruments having the function of a general anti-avoidance rule. First of all, 
the CCTB Directive Proposal has a general anti-avoidance rule in Article 58. Sec-
ond, the CCCTB Directive Proposal has a »safe-guard clause« in Article 29. Alt-
hough these two provisions are formulated differently and have different ori-
gins,49 from the perspective of tax authorities, these two articles have two similar 
functions and can be used for the adjustment of unfair or unreasonable results at 
the tax base level and the apportionment level.50 In the 2011 CCCTB Proposal Di-
rective, these two Articles are provided in Article 8051 and Article 87 respectively. 
 
49 The »safe-guard clause« is based on the formulary apportionment experiences from states in 
USA. See Hellerstein, Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provi-
sions: The Good, The bad, and The Ugly (n 25).  
50. According to Michael Lang, the GAAR in the 2011 CCCTB Directive Proposal is not used to 
solve the disputes derived from the formulary apportionment. See Michael Lang, »European 
Union – The General Anti-Abuse Rule of Article 80 of the Draft Proposal for a Council Di-
rective on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base« (2011) 51 European Taxation 223-
28. Harris is very skeptical for the effectiveness of the GAAR of 2011 CCCTB Directive Pro-
posal, see Peter Harris, »The CCCTB GAAR: a toothless tiger or Russian roulette?« in Dennis 
Weber (ed), CCCTB Selected Issues (Kluwer Law International 2012).  
51. The Comparison between the GAAR in 2011 CCCTB Directive Proposal and 2016 CCCTB 
Directive Proposal, see Frans Vanistendael, »Tax Avoidance and the Return of CC(C)TB« in 
Dennis Weber and Jan van de Streek, The EU Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: Critical 
Analysis (Wolters Kluwer 2017).  
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Since 2016, the CCTB and CCCTB Directives are separate, so these two provisions 
are also separate. Unfortunately, these two provisions are not that useful to the 
strategy of playing losses. The explanations are elaborated as follows. 
Article 58 of the CCTB Directive (the general anti-abuse rule) provides that, 
»1. For the purposes of calculating the tax base under the rules of this Directive, a Member State 
shall disregard an arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put in place 
for the essential purpose of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of 
this Directive, are not genuine, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances. An ar-
rangement may comprise more than one step or part.  
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, an arrangement or a series thereof shall be regarded as 
non-genuine to the extent that they are not put in place for valid commercial reasons that re-
flect economic reality.  
3. Arrangements or a series thereof that are disregarded in accordance with paragraph 1 shall 
be treated, for the purpose of calculating the tax base, by reference to their economic sub-
stance.«  
Article 29 of the CCCTB Directive (i.e. the safeguard clause) provides, 
»As an exception to the rule set out in Article 28, if the principal taxpayer or a competent author-
ity considers that the outcome of the apportionment of the consolidated tax base to a group 
member does not fairly represent the extent of the business activity of that group member, the prin-
cipal taxpayer or competent authority may request the use of an alternative method for calculat-
ing the tax share of each group member. An alternative method can be used only if, following 
consultations among the competent authorities and, where applicable, discussions held in ac-
cordance with Articles 77 and 78, all these authorities agree to that alternative method. The 
Member State of the principal tax authority shall inform the Commission about the alternative 
method used«. (Emphasized added) 
Both provisions (Article 58 of the CCTB Directive Proposal and Article 28 of the 
CCCTB Directive Proposal) have the similar function of addressing the tax avoid-
ance scenarios. More specifically, Article 28 can be used to adjust the unfair ap-
portionment results that do not fairly represent the extent of the business activity 
of group members. In other words, when there are »factor-shifting« scenarios, Ar-
ticle 28 can be adopted jointly by Member States involved. However, Article 28 
only addresses the situation when the apportionment result does not match the 
economic activities represented by the three weighting factors. Such unfairness 
can take place when the scope or definition of the weighting factors are not ap-
propriately regulated. Therefore, it would be difficult to qualify »shifting activi-
ties to a high tax rate jurisdiction« in reaction to losses-making realities, as »not 
fairly representing the extent of the business activity«, because the apportionment 
result has represented the activities. When a CCCTB taxpayer increases real eco-
nomic activities in a jurisdiction, the increase of the formulary ratio of that juris-
diction would be justified, and the safe-guard clause in Article 29 of the CCCTB 
Directive could not be invoked.  
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 As to the GAAR in Article 58 of the CCTB Directive proposal, it is hard to cov-
er the Shifting-To-Losses strategy. First of all, the GAAR concept under the EU 
law is developed by Directives and jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of Euro-
pean Justice (CJEU)52 on direct taxation,53 VAT54 and customs duties.55 To invoke a 
GAAR is in fact quite difficult because there are several tests in a GAAR. There 
are two tests embedded in a GAAR, the subjective test (i.e. the taxpayer’s inten-
tion) and the objective test (i.e. the economic reality).56 The subjective test in dif-
ferent tax law fields is formulated differently by the CJEU.57 Second, in a EU 
GAAR as such, the norm test (i.e. the purpose of the law being circumvented and 
 
52. Literature regarding GAAR under the EU tax law is enormous. See foe example, Koen Le-
naerts, »The Concept of ‘Abuse of Law’ in The Case Law of the European Court of Justice on 
Direct Taxation« (2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 329-51; Ju-
dith Freedman, »General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAARs) – A Key Element of Tax Systems 
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abused) also plays a decisive role. A tax avoidance scenario must be conducted to 
circumvent or qualify the effect of a norm, and thus deviates the original »pur-
pose of the norm«.58 Therefore, a GAAR under the EU law, would require cumu-
latively the subjective test, the objective test and the norm test, to negate a 
claimed tax avoidance. It is especially hard to qualify the norm test in a case of 
loss offsetting.  
 The purpose of the loss-offsetting mechanism is to reflect the taxpayer’s ability 
to pay and to allow cross-border loss setting between affiliated group members. 
This has been seen as a powerful tool to encourage multinational tax payers to ac-
cept the CCCTB. Third, from the jurisprudence of the CJEU such as Marks & 
Spencer,59 the Court is quite concerned that any losses turn to be final losses and 
are »stranded« in one Member State. Under this context, it would also be difficult 
to invoke the GAAR in the CCCTB Directive Proposal to restrict cross-border loss 
offsetting, because cross-border loss offsetting is exactly one of the main purposes 
pursued and encouraged by the CCCTB. Therefore, to adopt the GAAR to a loss-
offsetting scenario would not be easy and would not be a feasible solution. 
 Furthermore, although establishing a GAAR in the national tax law systems is 
a well-accepted trend influenced by the BEPS project since 2013,60 the BEPS pro-
ject itself does not directly address loss-offsetting issues. As Lüdicke et al. critical-
ly indicate,61 the whole BEPS project does not provide insightful instructions to 
cross-border losses offsetting issues from the very beginning. The BEPS project as 
a whole also has a very traditional view of profit shifting, focusing on shifting 
profits to relative low tax rate jurisdictions.62 Therefore, a GAAR would not be 
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very useful to address any existing strategy regarding loss offsetting, not to men-
tion the counter-intuitive strategy of Shifting-To-Losses. A GAAR or similar gen-
eral rules are not as useful as expected. 
 Finally, it should also be noted that the above-mentioned difficulty to apply 
GAAR to the Shifting-To-Losses strategy does not justify such strategy under the 
EU law. It is true that, from the EU law perspective, the risk of unutilized losses 
should not become potential barriers for cross-border investments. It is also true 
that, increasing investments in a loss-making affiliate can be based on valid 
commercial reasons, such as taking into account an economic cycle or maintain-
ing the market. Loss-making affiliates can possibly turn to profit making again 
after receiving intervention and assistance from other affiliates in the same group. 
Multinational taxpayers are free to legitimately invest for their own benefit. 
However, the current CCCTB Directive Proposal has already provided opportu-
nities to apportion the losses, and the EU legislators are not aware of such oppor-
tunities because they also embrace the traditional view of »shifting profits to low 
tax rate jurisdictions« like the OECD’s BEPS project. From a perspective of re-
forming EU tax law for establishing a well-functioning internal market, it would 
also be necessary to take actions in advance and provide appropriate counter-
measures to prevent the new CCCTB system from being manipulated.  
4. A Feasible Solution: Annual Quantitative Restrictions to 
Loss-Offsetting  
In the previous Section, we have discussed the tax planning opportunities arising 
from the loss-offsetting rules. To effectively restrict the amount of loss being off-
set, a quantitative restriction would be practical and easy to administer. Such an 
approach is actually being discussed in the process of CCCTB development, 
though it is not adopted in the 2016 CCCTB Directive Proposal. 
 When the Council discussed the 2011 CCCTB Directive proposal, there were 
several restrictions suggested. In 2012, the Council presidency produced a com-
promise Proposal.63 The 2012 CCCTB Compromise Proposal adopted the quanti-
tative limitation for loss-offsetting: »In a tax year, losses carried forward may be 
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deducted up to a maximum of EUR 1 million for a single taxpayer and any exceed-
ing loss can only be deducted up to 60 % of the remaining tax base«.64  
 The 2012 Compromise Proposal’s attempt is quite practical because it address-
es the effect directly arising from loss offsetting. The 2012 Compromise Proposal 
has proposed two indicators in the annual quantitative limitation: the amount of 
losses that is allowed to be used by a single taxpayer, and the ratio of loss-
offsetting from the remaining tax base, including the consolidated tax base as 
well as the apportioned tax base. In my view, as to the problem of Shifting-To-
Losses in a relatively high tax rate, the annual quantitative limitation for loss-
offsetting should include a third indicator: the amount of losses being offset multiplied 
by the national statutory corporate tax rate of the jurisdiction where the losses are utilized. 
This indicator will show the precise amount that a taxpayer»saves« after loss off-
setting when the annual quantitative limitation for loss-offsetting includes these 
three indicators, the annual cap for the losses being offset by one single taxpayer, 
the cap for the extent of deduction from the remaining tax base, and the cap of the 
tax burden that is actually being saved (i.e. the taxable income which is offset by 
the losses, multiplied the statutory tax rate of that Member State). The third indi-
cator can reflect the influence through the different tax rates, and thus represent 
another aspect different from the amount of losses and the amount of the remain-
ing tax base. 
 An annual quantitative limitation is desirable, however, such quantitative 
limitation also requires some flexibility. Since it is a quantitative limitation at the 
EU law level, the European Commission should play a more active role. Such 
quantitative limitation for offsetting losses can be published in advance and ad-
justed annually or every three years by the European Commission. For taxpayers, 
legal certainty can be achieved because taxpayers can estimate and expect the 
amount of losses they are entitled to utilize. For Member States, a quantitative 
limitation is also very straightforward. For the European Commission itself, it can 
conduct thorough economic research before it publishes the quantitative limita-
tion for losses. Although an annual quantitative limitation is still quite rough, 
such an annual ratio can be adjusted to fulfill the practical situation every year. A 
quantitative limitation announced by the European Commission is also easy to 
administer and apply for tax authorities of EU Member States. Such measure 
would lead to a win-win situation for all stakeholders: European Union, Member 
States and taxpayers. 
 There is indeed a concern for adopting such annual quantitative limitation for 
offsetting losses under the CCCTB, that such limitation might be contrary to the 
fundamental »ability to pay principle«, because it directly restricts the amount of 
loss-offsetting. Such concern might not be convincing. In most national tax sys-
 
64. ibid, Article 43 (2) of the 2012 CCCTB Compromise Proposal.  
  THE STRATEGY OF SHIFTING-TO-LOSSES ... 25 
tems, loss-offsetting rules are not unlimited. It is quite often to set time limitations 
for loss offsetting, such as the carry-forward period or carry-back period.65 The 
fundamental rationale of allowing loss offsetting in the tax law, is to reflect the 
real ability to pay and the economic reality of a taxpayer who must file the tax re-
turn according to the tax year. Deciding the tax base according to a tax year is an 
»artificial« division of economic activities, a type of legal fiction, since economic 
activities are continuous in real life. To set an annual quantitative limitation for 
offsetting losses under the CCCTB is not to completely abolish the loss-offsetting 
possibility, but merely mitigate the immediate consequences of strategy of offset-
ting-to-losses in a relatively high tax rate jurisdiction. As long as the CCCTB still 
allows a long enough carry-forward period, an annual quantitative limitation 
would not infringe the ability to pay principle. It is true that, such quantitative 
limitation would slow down the loss offsetting and thus there is a worry that 
there will be more unutilized losses for a longer time, and unutilized losses 
would face the risk of becoming the »final« losses. However, we should bear in 
mind that, via consolidation or group loss relief mechanisms, the CCTB and 
CCCTB already provide very favorable loss-offsetting rules. An annual quantita-
tive limitation would be necessary to ensure the apportionment rule not being 
used to facilitate loss offsetting »too soon« and »too much«. 
5. Conclusion 
Corporate losses can play a role in multinationals’ tax planning scenarios because 
the process offsetting corporate losses has the same effect of making part of in-
come subject to the zero tax rate. To utilize losses incurred from a relative high 
tax rate jurisdiction, can de facto make more taxable income subject to the zero tax 
rate because the not-yet-offset taxable income in a relative high tax rate jurisdic-
tion will result in a heavier tax burden than these in a relatively low tax rate ju-
risdiction. Theoretically speaking, there is an incentive to shift profits to a high tax 
rate jurisdiction in order to let losses incurred in this relative high tax rate juris-
diction be offset.  
 Empirical evidence shows that losses incurred in a high tax rate jurisdiction 
can also be an incentive for multinational taxpayers to shift profits to that jurisdic-
tion. Such scenarios of Shifting-To-Losses can also take place under the proposed 
CCCTB Directive Proposal under EU law according to its current text and the EU 
legislators do not seem to be quite aware of this problem. Both pre-entry and con-
solidated losses can be manipulated under the Shifting-To-Losses scenario. The 
traditional ring-fencing mechanism for pre-entry losses in the consolidation tax 
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system unfortunately does not help to combat such a scenario. Furthermore, the 
formulary apportionment system under the CCCTB Directive Proposal allows the 
scenario Shifting-To-Losses 2.0. The Shifting-To-Losses 2.0 scenario makes it pos-
sible to shift part of consolidated losses to the jurisdiction other than where they 
are incurred, including a relatively high tax rate jurisdiction by the CCCTB shar-
ing formula. In a world where tax rates of different jurisdictions will never be 
harmonized, Shifting-To-Losses scenarios reflect another aspect of the BEPS prob-
lem. For implementing the CCCTB Directive in the EU, a feasible and practical so-
lution would be adopting an annual quantitative restriction to loss offsetting, so 
tax authorities of Member States have to monitor the loss offsetting closely. At the 
same time, taxpayers also enjoy legal certainty to a greater extent and it could re-
sult in a win-win situation while addressing the problem. 
